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Abstract—The need for a larger Internet address space was
acknowledged early on, and a solution (IPv6) standardized years
ago. Its adoption has, however, been anything but easy and still
faces significant challenges. The situation begs the questions of
“why has it been so difficult?” and “what could have been (or still
be) done to facilitate this migration?” There has been significant
recent interest in those questions, and the paper builds on a
line of work based on technology adoption models to explore
them. The results confirm the impact of several known factors,
but also provide new insight. In particular, they highlight the
destabilizing effect of Internet Service Providers (ISPs) offering
competing alternatives (to IPv6), and demonstrate the benefits of
even minimum coordination among them in offering IPv6 as an
option. The findings afford additional visibility into what affects
technology transition in large systems with complex dependencies
such as the Internet.
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I. INTRODUCTION
IANA ran out of IPv4 addresses in February 2011 (see
http://www.nro.net/news/ipv4-free-pool-depleted), and even if
IPv4 addresses scarcity has not yet materialized everywhere,
we are slowly but surely headed in that direction. IPv6 was
designed to address this issue, but migrating from IPv4 to
IPv6 remains rife with challenges. Those challenges are not
(anymore) of a technical nature, and instead due in part to a
lack of incentives for the current (IPv4) Internet to migrate
to IPv6. The marginal migration of the IPv4 Internet to IPv6
together with the incompatibility of IPv6 and IPv4 are forcing
the use of translation mechanisms [1], [2] to allow IPv6-only
users access to the IPv4-only Internet. While necessary for a
transition, the availability of those mechanisms itself further
reduces the motivation for current IPv4 users to adopt IPv6.
The lack of strong incentives notwithstanding, there are sig-
nificant commercial interests that should help drive the Inter-
net’s migration to IPv6. The lists of participants in events such
as the 2011 World IPv6 Day1 and the subsequent 2012 World
IPv6 Launch2 clearly demonstrate such a will. However, and
in spite of this real desire, native end-to-end IPv6 connectivity
remains spotty, e.g., see http://mnlab-ipv6.seas.upenn.edu/fig1.
A goal of this paper is, therefore, to explore and explain
what may be behind IPv6 ongoing struggle, and possibly
suggest ways of mitigating it. Our initial intuition was that
besides the role of IPv4 incumbency, the distributed structure
of the Internet also had an impact. Specifically, the benefit of
∗This work was supported by NSF grant CNS-1116039.
1See http://internetsociety.org/ipv6/archive-2011-world-ipv6-day.
2See http://www.worldipv6launch.org.
migrating to IPv6 depends to a large extent on what others
in the Internet do. This is not an uncommon situation (e.g.,
see [3] for a related discussion in the context of Internet
security protocols), but uncertainty in the decisions of others
can significantly delay the adoption of a new technology.
To better understand the extent to which this may be the
case, several simple yet representative scenarios and models
were developed. We acknowledge up-front the many simpli-
fying assumptions they rely on (a necessity in most modeling
efforts), and their lack of completeness. However, they incor-
porate major aspects of IPv6 adoption decisions, namely, they
(i) heterogeneity in the Internet stake-holders making those
decisions; (ii) a representative sample of available technology
options; and (iii) the dependencies that exist across decisions.
An important finding from those scenarios and models is
that in an uncoordinated (competitive) setting, it is difficult for
ISPs to effectively decide how to choose between and price
connectivity options, including IPv63. The uncertainty this
creates slows down decisions to migrate to a new technology
such as IPv6, or at the very least create a more haphazard
migration process, as has indeed been the case. More impor-
tantly, it makes planning for a successful migration strategy
more difficult. Another finding of interest is that even minimal
coordination among ISPs, e.g., an Internet-level agreement to
consistently offer IPv6 as an option, allows strategies to emerge
that can eventually lead to a successful migration to IPv6.
This does not mean that coordination alone is sufficient, but it
affords an understanding of the role different factors play, and
hence the opportunity for a more predictable outcome.
The paper’s contributions are, therefore, two-fold:
(i) It illustrates how, in the presence of competing options
to handle IPv4 address exhaustion, the distributed decision
process of Internet stake-holders can make identifying “win-
ning strategies” difficult and therefore contribute to continued
difficulties in migrating to an IPv6 Internet; and
(ii) It demonstrates how the introduction of limited coordina-
tion among ISPs,while not in itself sufficient to ensure IPv6
success, affords greater insight into the impact of different
parameters and, therefore, facilitates a smoother migration.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section II
introduces IPv6 adoption scenarios and models, including
Internet stake-holders and the utility functions guiding their
decisions. Sections III and IV explore uncoordinated and co-
ordinated scenarios, respectively, and discuss the implications
of the results. Section V briefly reviews related works, with
Section VI summarizing the paper’s findings and recommen-
dations.
3IPv6 slow uptake has resulted in other alternatives being considered.
II. SCENARIOS AND MODELS
Many factors arguably contribute to IPv6 adoption deci-
sions, and any (tractable) model is unlikely to account for
all of them and their variations across stake-holders. In this
section, we introduce and motivate the different factors the
models rely on, and the two-sided market approach used to
capture dependencies and interactions between stake-holders.
A. Core IPv6 Adoption Factors
1) Internet stake-holders: We distinguish between three
types of Internet stake-holders: Internet Service Providers
(ISPs), Internet Content Providers (ICPs), and Internet Con-
sumers (users). ISPs derive revenues from providing Internet
connectivity to both ICPs and users, and are, therefore, con-
cerned with the choices and costs of the technologies used
to implement this connectivity. ICPs obtain the bulk of their
revenues from users that connect to them over the Internet.
Hence, their focus is on the quality of their connectivity to
users and how it may affect revenues, as well as any cost they
may incur to upgrade their existing infrastructure to support
a new connectivity option, e.g., IPv6. Finally, users purchase
Internet connectivity from ISPs, and use it primarily to connect
to ICPs (and to a lesser extent to each others). Hence, they are
affected by the cost of Internet connectivity and by its quality.
2) Internet connectivity options: ISPs are the providers of
Internet connectivity, and therefore control technology choices.
We consider three representative technology options ISPs may
choose from to accommodate customer growth.
The first is to simply continue using public IPv4 addresses.
This has the advantage of full compatibility with the cur-
rent Internet, but given the growing scarcity of public IPv4
addresses is likely to quickly involve added costs, e.g., to
purchase public IPv4 addresses from an address market such
as Hilco Streambank IPv4 Address Marketplace.
The second option relies on private IPv4 addresses to-
gether with Carrier-Grade NATs (CGNs). Unlike public IPv4
addresses, private IPv4 addresses can be reused and so are not
scarce. CGNs are required to allow connectivity to the public
Internet, but the technology behind CGNs is mature. Private
IPv4 addresses also have the benefit of letting ISPs defer a
potentially expensive upgrade of their network to IPv6. The
main disadvantage (to the ISP) is the cost of CGNs, which
grows as more users are assigned private IPv4 addresses.
IPv6 is the third option. IPv6 addresses are not scarce,
but like private IPv4 addresses will require some form of
“translation,” e.g., NAT64 [1] or DSLite [2], to allow IPv6
users to communicate with the IPv4 Internet. IPv6↔IPv4
translation is less mature than that for private IPv4 addresses,
and may therefore be initially more expensive. On the flip
side, even if the exact time-frame remains unclear, the need
for translation, and therefore its cost, should disappear as the
Internet eventually migrates to IPv6.
3) Technology adoption dependencies: As alluded to, al-
though ISPs choose Internet technologies, their decisions,
including pricing, depend heavily on users and ICPs. For
example, an ISP offering both IPv6 and (public) IPv4 connec-
tivity can offer a discount for IPv6, thereby attracting users
to that option and lowering the need for (expensive) public
IPv4 addresses. However, more IPv6 users also means higher
translation costs, unless this entices more ICPs to become
IPv6 accessible thereby lessening the need for translation.
This creates a complex web of dependencies, whose impact
is amplified by the distributed decision process that prevails
in the Internet. As we shall see, this can make devising sound
(profit maximizing) strategies difficult if not impossible.
B. Adoption Scenarios
IPv6 adoption decisions are obviously affected by many
other factors, and our goal is not to devise an all inclusive
model. Instead, we seek to incorporate some of the main de-
pendencies that connect the decisions of Internet stake-holders.
As we shall see next, even accounting only for those aspects
gives rise to complex models and a broad range of possible
scenarios. We describe next representative configurations we
use to explore this space, and shed some light on the type of
outcomes that can emerge.
For normalization, all scenarios start with an Internet user
population of unit size, i.e., the size of the current Internet.
This population is then increased in discrete steps of δ users.
At each step, new and existing users evaluate the Internet
connectivity choices available to them through their local
ISP(s)4, and select5 the one with the highest utility. We define
a user’s utility in Section II-C1, but it depends primarily on the
cost and quality of her Internet connectivity. Users are assumed
heterogeneous, but primarily in their sensitivity to connectivity
quality6. We further assume (see [5] for a related discussion)
that address translation devices, if used, are the main contrib-
utors to degradation in connectivity quality/functionality.
Because ICPs are part of the current Internet, they already
have a public IPv4 address, and their only decision is whether
or not to become IPv6 accessible. They incur a cost when
doing so (upgrading their existing IPv4 infrastructure and/or
update of operational processes), but unlike users that can
change their decisions, an ICP’s decision to become IPv6
accessible is irreversible (once incurring the upgrade cost).
The goal behind the adoption scenarios we describe next is
to span a representative combination of connectivity offerings.
The first two assume a competitive environment with ISPs
offering different connectivity options and setting prices so as
to maximize their own profit. The third scenario assumes some
coordination. ISPs do not compete on the basis of connectivity,
i.e., all offer identical connectivity options, including IPv6.
Connectivity options still compete for users, but now internally
to each ISP.
4According to http://www.broadbandmap.gov/summarize/nationwide, over
99% of the U.S. population can choose from two or more ISPs, while this
figure is 90% in Europe (see http://goo.gl/MjTPJ6).
5We acknowledge that allowing users to re-evaluate their decision at every
time step ignores many factors that introduce inertia in those decisions,
e.g., contractual agreements. However, as discussed in [4] for a related
system, while such factors have a quantitative impact, they typically do not
qualitatively change the outcome.
6Coarser grain heterogeneity is also possible, e.g., between, say, residential
and enterprise users, but adds significant complexity to the model. Similarly,
heterogeneity in price sensitivity can also be included, but with again a cost
in terms of complexity.
1) IPv6 vs. Public IPv4: Given that the main competition
that IPv6 faces is the incumbent IPv4 Internet, the first scenario
considers the case of two ISPs, one having embraced IPv6
as the technology of choice for its new customers, while
the other has decided to defer any migration and to simply
acquire additional public IPv4 addresses to accommodate new
customers. The first ISP needs to deploy address translation
devices to allow its new (IPv6) customers to connect to the
legacy IPv4 Internet. This cost grows with the number of users
that choose IPv6, and decreases as more ICPs become IPv6
accessible7. Conversely, while the second ISP does not incur
translation costs, it needs to purchase public IPv4 addresses for
its new customers. Those costs are expected to rise as public
IPv4 addresses become scarcer.
2) IPv6 vs. private IPv4 and CGN: In this scenario, no
ISP wants to incur the cost of purchasing more public IPv4
addresses (or those addresses are unavailable for purchase).
ISPs that defer upgrading to IPv6 would then rely on private
IPv4 addresses. Offerings based on either IPv6 or private
IPv4 addresses both require translation (CGNs) to connect to
the public IPv4 Internet. Translation costs for private IPv4
are likely to be lower than for IPv6, if only because of
more mature technology and/or greater operational familiarity
and compatibility with the current Internet. On the flip side,
translation costs for private IPv4 keep increasing as more users
join, independent of how many ICPs become IPv6 accessible.
3) IPv6 and public IPv4: On the technology choice front,
this scenario is identical to the first one, namely, both IPv6
and public IPv4 are available as connectivity options. The
main difference is that the two options are now systematically
offered by all ISPs, and therefore priced internally to maximize
their own profit, as opposed to competitively. This is equivalent
to having a monopolistic ISP that sets the price of both options.
C. Decision Processes
We capture the interactions and decision dependencies of
ISPs, ICPs and users through a two-sided market model [6].
The ISP is the market maker through its offering of connec-
tivity options, while users and ICPs are the two sides of the
market that derive value from each other through the market.
1) Users utility: Users derive a unit value from Internet
connectivity, with price and quality affecting their overall
utility. Recall that quality is assumed to be primarily affected
by (the presence of) translation devices. A user’s utility is then
captured through the following expression:
Uuser(σ) = 1− pR − σaRγR , (1)
where R indexes connectivity options, pR is the price of type
R connectivity (ppub. IPv4 > pIPv6 > ppriv. IPv4), aR ∈ [0, 1]
quantifies quality (translation) impairments for connectivity
option R, if any (aR is 0 for public IPv4 and positive for
both private IPv4 and IPv6), γR is the fraction of the Internet
(ICPs) affected by those impairments, and σ ∈ [0, 1] denotes
a user sensitivity to impairments8.
7Translation costs are assumed proportional to the volume of traffic that
needs to be translated, i.e., higher capacity devices are needed.
8σ captures users’ heterogeneity and, as commonly done for analytical
tractability, is assumed uniformly distributed in [0, 1] (the results typically
also hold for distributions with increasing hazard rates [7]).
2) ICPs utility: ICPs derive revenues from users, and those
revenues can be affected by connectivity quality [8]. A major
factor in an ICP’s decision to become IPv6 accessible9 is,
therefore, the impact this decision can have on the revenue
it generates from IPv6 users, and how this compares to the
cost of upgrading to IPv6 (or convincing its hosting provider
to upgrade). Revenue improvements depend on the number of
IPv6 users and how they are affected by the ICP’s adoption
of IPv6. In particular, and as shown in [9], IPv6 and IPv4
connectivity are now mostly on par, so that the main benefit
of native IPv6 access is to eliminate the need for translation.
The cost of upgrading to IPv6 is largely a function of
the “size” of the ICP’s infrastructure. For simplicity, this size
is assumed proportional to the Internet user-base (the traffic
volume an ICP sees grows with the Internet). The net utility
in(de)crease an ICP derives from becoming IPv6 accessible
can, therefore, be captured as follows:
∆6(ICP) = n6a6 − Sinfraθc6 (2)
where n6 is the number of IPv6 users, a6 the per-user revenue
gain from eliminating translation, and θc6 the per-user upgrade
cost of the ICP’s infrastructure (of size Sinfra). θ captures
heterogeneity in cost structure across ICPs, and as with users’
heterogeneity, i.e., σ, is assumed uniformly distributed in [0, 1].
There are obviously many simplifying assumptions behind
Eq. (2). In particular, it assumes that ICPs are homogeneous in
revenue and traffic, with their IPv6 adoption having, therefore,
equal weight in the eyes of users (clearly, Google becoming
IPv6 accessible has a bigger impact than when a smaller
ICP does). Nevertheless, it captures heterogeneity in ICPs’
decisions and that they are affected by costs and revenues.
Last, we note that the decision process behind Eq. (2) is
“myopic,” i.e., it compares near-term revenue improvements
(n6a6) and upgrade costs (Sinfraθc6). Strategic decisions that
account for future revenues and the fact that upgrade costs
grow with the ICP’s user-base (assuming c6 stays constant)
are a natural extension. We discuss its impact in [10].
3) ISP utility: An ISP’s utility (profit) depends on rev-
enues derived from users10 and costs. Given our aim of
assessing the impact of offering different connectivity options,
we focus on their cost contributions and ignore other cost
components. As costs differ across connectivity options, we
introduce the ISP’s utility function separately for each.
Public IPv4 only
An ISP that only offers public IPv4 connectivity has a
utility function of the form:
Πpub. 4 = n4p4 − C(n4 − 1)2+ (3)
n4 is the number of users willing to pay p4 for public IPv4
connectivity, while C(n4 − 1)2+ = C max(0, n4 − 1)2 is the
acquisition cost of the (n4−1) additional public IPv4 addresses
9As participation in events such “World IPv6 Launch Day” demonstrates,
there are obviously many other possible reasons for an ICP to become
IPv6 accessible. However, even when those other motivations prevail, the
importance of preserving connectivity quality remains, e.g., through the
enforcement of some form of “white-listing.”
10We ignore revenues from ICPs, as they are mostly independent from an
ISP’s connectivity choices.
the ISP needs beyond the “unit” block it already owns (to ac-
commodate its existing users). The quadratic function used for
address acquisition costs (C is a normalization constant) seeks
to capture that public IPv4 addresses will grow progressively
more expensive as they become scarcer.
IPv6 only (and IPv6↔IPv4 translation)
An ISP offering IPv6 connectivity has a utility of the form:
Π6 = n6p6 −D6n6γ6 , (4)
with n6 the number of users choosing IPv6 connectivity at a
price of p6, and D6n6γ6 the translation cost for those users.
Each user generates 1 unit of traffic distributed uniformly
across ICPs, so that if γ6 ICPs are not IPv6 accessible, n6γ6
units of traffic must be translated at a unit cost of D6.
Private IPv4 (and Private IPv4↔Public IPv4 translation)
The utility function of an ISP offering private IPv4 ad-
dresses is similar to Eq. (4), albeit with all traffic requiring
translation, namely,
Πp4 = np4pp4 −D4np4γp4 , (5)
where γp4 = 1, and as alluded to earlier, we expect D4 < D6.
III. THE IMPACT OF (CONNECTIVITY) COMPETITION
This section considers scenarios II-B1 and II-B2. They
involve (two) ISPs competing for users and offering different
connectivity options. One ISP relies on IPv6, but the other
has deferred upgrading to IPv6. Instead, it chooses to either
incur the (growing) cost of acquiring public IPv4 addresses
(II-B1), or to assign private IPv4 address to new users and rely
on translation (CGNs) to connect them to the public Internet
(II-B2). ISPs compete for users based on price and connectivity
quality, with prices endogenously set to maximize profit.
Specifically, we assume rational and myopic ISPs that
engage in a repeated multi-stage game played each time the
Internet increases by δ < 1 new users. ISPs first announce a
price for connectivity (see below), with users then choosing a
connectivity option in a best response manner, i.e., they select
the option that maximizes their utility.
As per Eq. (1), users’ utility depends on price (pR), quality
of connectivity (aR), and the fraction γR of ICPs affected by
quality impairment associated with connectivity option R. γR
is assumed known to users, and in the case of IPv6 depends on
the outcome of the previous round of the game, i.e., how many
ICPs have become natively accessible. ICPs decide whether
or not to become IPv6 accessible in the third and last stage
of the game, again in a best response manner and based on
the number of users that have chosen IPv6. ISPs are assumed
aware of the rationale and economic incentives guiding users
and ICPs decisions, e.g., based on surveys of users and ICPs.
Hence, they set prices that maximize their own profit, i.e., by
solving the above sequential decision process in reverse order.
An alternate game would have users and ICPs aware of
each others decisions, deciding simultaneously rather than
sequentially. This assumes that users are able to predict how
ICPs will respond to their decisions and vice versa, and makes
for a more complex and possibly less realistic game (neither
users nor ICPs may have access to the necessary information).
More importantly, the outcomes are similar to those of the
simpler sequential game. As a result, we focus on the latter.
A. IPv6 vs. Public IPv4 – Scenario II-B1
In this scenario, one ISP offers IPv6 and the other stays
with public IPv4 connectivity. Public IPv4 has an edge when
it comes to connectivity quality (a6 > 0), but that edge is
present only for the fraction γ6 of ICPs that require translation.
Conversely, the disadvantage of public IPv4 is the likely cost
of acquiring additional public IPv4 addresses.
1) Decision Mechanism & Solution: In round i of the
game and assuming IPv6 and public IPv4 announced prices of
p6 and p4, users and ICPs decisions proceed as follows.
Based on Eq. (1), a user with quality sensitivity σ chooses11
IPv6 if, 1−p6−σa6γ(i−1)6 ≥ 1−p4, where γ(i−1)6 denotes the
fraction of ICPs not yet IPv6 accessible after round (i−1) (this
information is available after each round, with γ(0)6 = 0 for
completeness). Hence, the fraction σ(i)6 of (new and existing)
users choosing IPv6 in round i satisfies
⇒ σ(i)6 =

0 if p4 − p6 < 0
p4−p6
a6γ
(i−1)
6
if 0 ≤ p4 − p6 ≤ a6γ(i−1)6
1 if p4 − p6 > a6γ(i−1)6
, (6)
The dependency on the price differential p4−p6 is intuitive.
For example, when the discount for IPv6 is larger than the
quality penalty perceived by the most quality sensitive user
(σ = 1), then all users select IPv6.
ICPs decide to become IPv6 accessible once knowing users
choices. From Eq. (2), they do if the difference between
the added revenue n6a6 this generates and the upgrade cost
Sinfraθc6 is positive. The latter depends on the current size
of the ICP’s infrastructure, Sinfra, which as mentioned earlier
is proportional to the Internet user-base in round (i − 1),
i.e., 1 + (i − 1)δ. Conversely, the revenue increase created
by becoming IPv6 accessible is proportional to the number
of users choosing IPv6 in round i, i.e., n(i)6 = (1 + iδ)σ
(i)
6 .
Assuming θ is uniformly distributed in [0, 1], ICPs for which
becoming IPv6 accessible yields a positive profit in round i are
those with θ ≤ θ(i)6 (conversely, the fraction of IPv6 accessible
ICPs after round i is γ(i)6 = 1− θ(i)6 ), where
θ
(i)
6 =

ka6
c6
if p4 − p6 > a6γ(i−1)6
ka6σ6
c6
if
γ
(i−1)
6
(1−γ(i−1)
6
)c6
k
≤ p4 − p6 ≤ a6γ(i−1)6
1− γ(i−1)6 Otherwise
(7)
where for notation simplicity k = 1+iδ1+(i−1)δ is the relative
growth in user population between rounds (i− 1) and i.
The first expression of Eq. (7) corresponds to all users
selecting IPv6, i.e., σ(i)6 = 1, which yields the maximum possi-
ble adoption of IPv6 among ICPs. IPv6 adoption progressively
11Recall that users are heterogeneous in how they value connectivity quality,
with σ uniformly distributed in [0, 1].
decreases as fewer users select IPv6 (second expression), down
to no less than 1 − γ(i−1)6 , which reflects the fact that ICPs
that upgraded to IPv6 in an earlier round cannot revert.
Eqs. (6) and (7) are known to the two competing ISPs,
which use them to optimize their own utility functions, as
expressed in Eqs. (3) and (4). This yields the following
expressions for optimal prices, where for simplicity we omit
the index i and use γ6 = 1− θ6.
p∗4 = argmax
p4
{(1 + iδ)(1− σ6)p4− (8)
C(((1 + iδ)(1− σ6))− 1)2+}
p∗6 = argmax
p6
{(1 + iδ)σ6p6 −D6σ6(1 + iδ)γ6} (9)
The two equations are coupled through Eqs. (6) and (7).
Explicitly solving this joint optimization is difficult12. It
can be formulated as the solution of a best response game
between the ISPs, each successively announcing and reacting
to the other’s price. In general, the game does not have a Nash
Equilibrium to which prices would converge. In particular and
as illustrated in the next section, instances of “cycles” in the
ISPs’ search for optimal prices arise in many cases. In other
words, competition between ISPs on the basis of connectivity
makes identifying rational operating (pricing) points difficult.
Interestingly but not surprisingly, dependencies between
Internet stake-holders’ decisions are largely responsible for
this. In particular, if ICPs’ decisions were independent of those
of users (or proceeded at a much slower pace), the game would
typically admit a unique Nash Equilibrium [10].
2) The Impact of Competition: ISPs’ inability to con-
verge to jointly optimal prices is primarily because the
coupling between users and ICPs’ decisions introduces two
distinct strategies for the IPv6 ISP, and correspondingly a
discontinuity in its utility function. When the price of public
IPv4 connectivity is high enough, it is best for the IPv6
ISP to heavily discount its connectivity to attract many users
and in turn convince many ICPs to become IPv6 accessible,
which lowers translation costs. This, however, triggers a price
decrease from the public IPv4 ISP to recoup part of its lost
user-base, and then forces the IPv6 ISP to itself lowers its price
to maintain a sufficiently attractive discount. This eventually
results in a public IPv4 price that is too low to allow the IPv6
ISP to give a large enough discount. The better strategy for the
IPv6 ISP is then to reduce its discount and attract fewer users.
Each user generates a higher revenue, and because there are
few of them, translation costs are low. This pattern is shown
in Fig. 1 that plots each ISPs’ best-responses as a function of
the other’s price, and includes an instance of a pricing cycle.
Cycles occur when the utility gap between the two strate-
gies of the IPv6 ISP is large enough to ensure that its best-
response function and that of the IPv4 ISP do not intersect.
Fig. 2 explores how often this arises across a reasonable range
of configurations. The price of IPv4 addresses is chosen to
have a normalization constant C = 1, so that the quadratic
cost function for IPv4 addresses yields a value of 1 when the
number of IPv4 Internet users reaches n4 = 2, i.e., doubles.
12Analytical solutions can be obtained, but are mostly negative results, e.g.,
the absence of a Nash Equilibrium, which do not shed insight into the problem.
Hence, we resort to numerical investigations to explore the solution space.
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Fig. 1. Cycle in ISPs best response game
In other words, doubling the size of the current IPv4 Internet
yields a public IPv4 address price equal to the value of Internet
connectivity itself. This choice reflects the fact that according
to current statistics there were about 2 billions Internet users
by the end of 2012, and given the ≈ 50−75% utilization of the
address space, a doubling of IPv4 users is then still possible.
A value of a6 = 0.08 was also assumed, which corresponds
to a relatively small (8%) degradation in connectivity quality.
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Fig. 2. IPv6 vs. public IPv4 competition
Fig. 2 shows the outcome of the game played by the
two ISPs as a function of unit translation costs, D6, and the
maximum per user IPv6 conversion cost an ICP incurs, c6.
Both are varied from a few percent to more than ten percent
of the base value of Internet connectivity. The figure illustrates
the presence of cycles in a wide range of configurations, and
in particular as soon as the cost of IPv6 conversion slightly
exceeds the added revenue it can generate.
B. IPv6 vs. Private IPv4 – Scenario II-B2
In this scenario, one ISP offers IPv6 addresses to new users,
while the other relies on private IPv4 addresses. Both require
translation (IPv6↔IPv4 and Private IPv4↔Public IPv4) to
communicate with the public IPv4 Internet. Both types of
translation equally affect connectivity quality, as measured by
a common parameter, a. The greater maturity of Private to
Public IPv4 translation benefits a Private IPv4 solution, since
D4 ≤ D6. On the flip side, IPv6 users incur translation penal-
ties only for the fraction γ6 of ICPs not yet IPv6 accessible.
As with the previous scenario, we describe next the de-
cision process of users and ICPs, and how the two ISPs
select their prices. For simplicity, we assume that only new
users decide on which connectivity option to choose. Allowing
existing (public IPv4) users to make such a choice requires
pricing a third option (public IPv4), which adds significant
complexity without qualitatively affecting the results.
1) Decision Mechanism & Solution: After the two ISPs
announce prices of p6 and pp4, (new) users choose an ISP as
per Eqs. (10) and (11), where σ(i)6 and σ
(i)
4 denote the fraction
of users choosing IPv6 or private IPv4 addresses in round i, re-
spectively. In particular, a user with quality sensitivity σ prefers
IPv6 over private IPv4 if 1−p6−σaγ(i−1)i ≥ 1−pp4−σa. Note
that since γ(i−1)6 ≤ 1, this implies that prices verify pp4 ≤ p6.
Note also, that it is possible that there exists a value σNA such
that for σ ≥ σNA, 1 − p6 − σaγ(i−1)i ≤ 0, i.e., users that are
very sensitive to connectivity impairment will altogether opt
out of connecting to the Internet. This can also arise in the
previous scenario, albeit much more rarely as the availability
of the public IPv4 option typically ensures that high σ users
have access to a suitable alternative13.
σ
(i)
p4 =

(p6−pp4)
a(1−γ(i−1)6 )
if pp4 >
p6−1+γ(i−1)6
γ
(i−1)
6
(1−pp4)
a if pp4 <
p6−1+γ(i−1)6
γ
(i−1)
6
(10)
σ
(i)
6 =

a(1−γ(i−1)6 )−(p6−pp4)
a(1−γ(i−1)6 )
if pp4 >
p6−1+γ(i−1)6
γ
(i−1)
6
& p6 < 1− aγ(i−1)6
(1−p6)
aγ
(i−1)
6
− (p6−pp4)
a(1−γ(i−1)6 )
if pp4 >
p6−1+γ(i−1)6
γ
(i−1)
6
& p6 > 1− aγ(i−1)6
0 if pp4 <
p6−1+γ(i−1)6
γ
(i−1)
6
(11)
Once users have selected their connectivity option, ICPs
proceed with their decisions as in the previous section. The
process followed by ISPs to select prices also parallels that of
the previous section, albeit with more complex expressions. We
refer the reader to [10] for more details, but the more important
aspect is that, as illustrated in the next section, pricing cycles
again frequently arise.
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Fig. 3. IPv6 vs. private IPv4 competition
2) The Impact of Competition: Fig. 3 offers a perspective
similar to that of Fig. 2, and reports the outcome of the
ISPs’ price selection process for a range of configurations.
There are some differences, e.g., coexistence arises rarely,
but there is nevertheless a broad range of parameters for
which cycle are present. As argued earlier, this makes devising
pricing strategies difficult and is likely to contribute continued
uncertainty in deciding how to settle on a migration strategy.
13It arises only for combinations of large C and D6 values, i.e., very high
acquisition costs for public IPv4 addresses and very high translation costs.
The next section explores how a consensus among ISPs in
what connectivity options to offer fosters better visibility into
migration strategies to an IPv6 Internet.
IV. THE BENEFIT OF CONNECTIVITY CONSENSUS
The previous section illustrated the difficulty of devising
effective strategies, when ISPs tackle public IPv4 address
shortage with competing connectivity options. The intent of
this section is not argue that to migrate to an IPv6 Internet,
we need to forfeit competition among ISPs. This would be
neither realistic nor meaningful. Instead, we want to argue
for shifting competition away from connectivity choices, i.e.,
have a consistent offering of connectivity choices among ISPs.
Choices need to be preserved, as users (and ICPs) are likely to
remain heterogeneous in their willingness to accept a migration
to IPv6. However, connectivity options should not be the basis
on which ISPs compete.
Specifically, we consider a scenario where all ISPs offer
Internet users the choice between IPv6 connectivity and tra-
ditional public IPv4 connectivity. Those two options continue
to compete for users, but now internally to each ISP. This
move from external to internal competition is by itself not
sufficient to ensure IPv6 success (the lack of clear incentives
and the complex dependencies that exist between stake-holders
decisions remain). However and most importantly, it offers
the opportunity for more direct visibility into how various
parameters affect IPv6 adoption. This in turn can allow the
formulation of recommendations on how to affect a faster
migration to an IPv6 Internet.
In the rest of this section, we first describe how an ISP
prices public IPv4 and IPv6 connectivity, and next explore the
outcomes it gives rise to. The results help identify the roles
of different parameters, and in particular which changes might
be most effective in migrating to an IPv6 Internet.
A. IPv6 and Public IPv4
Consider an ISP offering its users (new and existing)
the choice between traditional public IPv4 connectivity and
IPv6 connectivity at prices of p4 and p6, respectively. As in
the previous sections, users that opt for IPv6 must undergo
translation when connecting to the γ6 fraction of ICPs that
are not yet IPv6 accessible. As before, translation introduces
impairments of relative magnitude a. Similarly, the ISP incurs
a cost of D6 per unit of traffic that needs translation. The ISP
has an existing user-base of unit size, and therefore owns a
unit-size block of public IPv4 addresses. If it needs additional
public IPv4 addresses, it acquires them at a cost that, again as
before, grows quadratically, i.e., based on Eq. (3). ICPs decide
to become IPv6 accessible following the same process as that
of Section II-C2. We describe next how the ISP selects the
prices p4 and p6 that maximize its profit.
B. Decision Mechanism & Solution
Growth in the Internet user population again proceeds in
steps of size δ that coincide with epochs where the ISP adjusts
its prices p4 and p6. Choosing optimal prices involves solving
the following optimization problem
(p4, p6) = argmax
(p4,p6)
{
(1 + iδ)
(
1− p4 − p6
aγ
(i−1)
6
)
p4−
C
((
(1 + iδ)
(
1− p4 − p6
aγ
(i−1)
6
))
− 1
)2
+
(1 + iδ)
(
p4 − p6
aγ
(i−1)
6
)
p6
−D6(1 + iδ)
(
p4 − p6
aγ
(i−1)
6
)
(1− θ(i)6 )
}
, (12)
where γ(i−1)6 = 1 − θ(i−1)6 is known, while θ(i)6 needs to be
replaced by its expression from Eq. (7). Note that different
expressions must be used for θ(i)6 depending on the value of
p4 − p6. It is the need to consider those different cases that
makes solving Eq. (12) cumbersome though not impossible.
Except for the fact that the optimal price for public IPv4
always satisfies p4 = 1 (actually just below 1 to ensure positive
utility), the expression for an explicit solution for Eq. (12)
sheds little light on the role of different parameters, the reader
is again referred to [10] for details, and we instead rely on
numerical examples to explore the range of outcomes.
C. What Affects the Outcome and How?
Unsurprisingly, IPv6 adoption and the ISP’s pricing strat-
egy are directly affected by C, the normalization constant for
the cost of acquiring additional public IPv4 addresses, and
D6, the translation cost of one unit of traffic. In addition, two
other parameters indirectly affect the ISP’s strategy because of
how they influence users and ICPs decisions, namely, c6, the
per-user cost of upgrading the ICP infrastructure to IPv6, and
a, the relative magnitude of the impairment that translation
causes and consequently the loss in quality-of-experience for
users and the related revenue loss for the ICPs.
It is possible to scope the ranges some of those parameters
can span, e.g., C ≤ 1, but a complete sampling of this four-
dimensional space is impractical. We rely instead on several
figures to report how the outcome changes as some parameters
vary, while others remain fixed. The figures help identify
parameters that have a significant effect on IPv6 adoption by
both users and ICPs; hence suggesting possible strategies.
Figs. 4 and 5 plot three quantities as a function of the
ratio ac6 . The left hand-side of the figures gives the time to
full IPv6 adoption by ICPs (by how much the Internet user
population needs to increase to convince ICPs to become IPv6
accessible14). The right hand-sides of the figures give, after
doubling the size of the Internet user population, the (final)
fractions of users that have opted for IPv6, and of ICPs that
have become IPv6 accessible. The figures report the results for
two different configurations, namely, small and large values of
C, and for each configuration consider different ratios between
14Note that full adoption need not always be feasible.
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translation costs and IPv4 address acquisition costs, i.e., D6C
takes values 0.1, 1 and 10.
The figures illustrate a number of intuitive outcomes, and in
the process offer some level of “sanity checking” of the model.
For example, they confirm the expected positive impact on ICP
adoption of decreasing their upgrade cost, c6. But they also
reveal less obvious behaviors such as, for example, the effect
of a, which as we discuss next can have an ambiguous effect.
They also identify (combination of) parameters that have a
systematic effect on IPv6 adoption, i.e., the ratio ac6 .
Consider first the effect of a decrease in the level of
impairment, a, that translation imposes. Such a decrease can
(initially) make IPv6 more attractive to users by lowering the
penalty they incur when accessing ICPs that are not yet IPv6
accessible. This can increase the number of users that choose
IPv6, which can in turn entice more ICPs to become IPv6
accessible; possibly starting a positive feedback loop in IPv6
adoption. On the flip side, a lower a value also decreases
the potential revenue gain ICPs derive from becoming IPv6
accessible. This makes it more likely that revenue increases
won’t offset adoption costs; hence reducing ICPs’ adoption of
IPv6. This would in turn make IPv6 less attractive to users,
and having fewer users opting for IPv6 would further reduce
its attractiveness to ICPs. As we can see, the role of changes
in a on IPv6 adoption is unclear, and the figures help elucidate
under which conditions changes in a improve IPv6 adoption.
First, the figures illustrate that an increase in the ratio ac6
systematically results in higher IPv6 adoption by ICPs and to
a lesser extent users. In the case of ICPs, ac6 represents the
ICP’s return on IPv6 adoption from a single user. An increase
in this return motivates more ICPs to make such an adoption
choice. When this increase is through an increase in a (rather
than a decrease in c6 that is trivially beneficial to both ICPs
and users), the greater number of ICPs that opt to become
IPv6 accessible offsets the larger penalty that users suffer when
accessing ICPs that are not IPv6 accessible. In other words,
users experience greater impairments when accessing ICPs that
still require translation, but because there are fewer such ICPs,
the impact is mitigated. Consequently, the number of users that
choose IPv6 is not overly affected even if differences exist. In
general, while both Figs. 4 and 5 establish that a larger ratio
a
c6
benefits IPv6 adoption by both ICPs and users, ensuring a
complete migration to an IPv6 Internet requires a large enough
value. How large this value needs to be depends on a number
of factors, and in particular C and D6, which as we discuss
next introduce some interesting behaviors in their own right.
Specifically, consider scenarios associated with Region 1
in Figs. 4 and 5, for which the ICPs’ return on IPv6 adoption
( ac6 ) is low, i.e., the ICPs have limited incentives for becoming
IPv6 accessible. In such a regime, low translations costs15, D6,
afford the ISP enough leeway to price IPv6 competitively and
convince some users, and consequently ICPs, to adopt IPv6.
This is reflected in the higher adoption levels of both users
and ICPs as D6 decreases. Interestingly, increasing the ICPs’
return on IPv6 adoption ac6 has little effect on the number of
users that adopt IPv6, though it affects (increases) the number
of ICPs that elect to become IPv6 accessible. As alluded to
earlier, this is because while there may be more ICPs that
can be accessed natively over IPv6, this benefit is offset by
the greater impairments users experience when accessing the
remaining ICPs.
Further increases in the ICPs’ return on IPv6 adoption ( ac6 )
eventually trigger a shift in adoption, with all users and ICPs
adopting IPv6. When and how this shift happens is, however,
affected by the relative magnitude of IPv4 address acquisition
costs, C, and IPv6 address translation costs, D6.
When IPv4 address acquisition costs are high (Region 3
of Fig. 5), the shift is abrupt. This is because the high cost
of IPv4 addresses entices the ISP to aggressively discount
IPv6 early on to quickly convince ICPs and users alike to
adopt IPv6. This can be seen by comparing the left hand-
side plots of Figs. 4 and 5 that report time to full IPv6
adoption16 by ICPs, and which show that it is reached much
faster when the cost of IPv4 addresses is high. In contrast,
when IPv4 addresses costs are relatively low (Region 2 of
Fig. 4), the transition to full adoption is more progressive and
dependent on the relative magnitude of translation costs. In
particular, when translation costs are low, the ISP may initially
offer only a limited discount for IPv6, which can prevent
full IPv6 adoption and prolong the coexistence of IPv4-only
and IPv6-only Internets (as the Internet user-base grows, so
do the benefits for ICPs of becoming IPv6 accessible, but
unfortunately so do their upgrade costs). In other words, if
IPv4 addresses remain cheap for an extended period of time, it
not only prolongs the transition to an IPv6 Internet, it may also
make it significantly more expensive by deterring many ICPs
15Note that changes in translation costs are chosen proportional to C, which
explains in part the similarity of Figs. 4 and 5.
16Note that the low translation cost scenario (D6 = 0.1C) of Fig. 4 allows
full adoption only when a
c6
= 2, while in Fig. 5 the scenarios D6 = C and
D6 = 10C yield identical times to full IPv6 adoption.
from migrating early; hence, incurring higher conversion costs
later on (they will need to migrate a bigger infrastructure).
The above discussion highlights a potential shortcoming of
the model, namely, the myopic decision process used by both
ISPs and ICPs. More strategic ISPs and ICPs could foresee the
impact of continued growth in the Internet user-base and make
early (IPv6) pricing and adoption decisions accordingly. This
would likely result in improved adoption outcomes in a number
of scenarios. We have explored (numerically) the impact of
introducing a more strategic decision making process for ISPs
and ICPs. As expected, it did lead to faster and more optimistic
adoption outcomes, but did not significantly affect the roles of
different parameters as identified in this section. Details of the
investigation can be found in [10].
V. RELATED WORKS
Explaining the slow progress of IPv6 adoption has been
the focus of much prior work (see [11] for a recent overview).
Earlier works focused on identifying technical issues that
created initial adoption hurdles [12]–[15], but as those were
eventually addressed, the attention shifted towards measuring
IPv6 adoption progress [9], [16]–[21], as well as exploring the
role that economic forces may be playing [22]–[28].
Those latter works bear the most direct relevance to the
investigation presented in this paper, with [22] echoing many
of the same themes we identify, including the importance of
coordination, albeit without analytical support. Casting IPv6
adoption as a game was proposed in [28], but one with
Autonomous Systems as the sole players, i.e., it did not account
for either users or ICPs. The use of two-sided markets to
capture dependencies between the decisions of Internet stake-
holders was suggested in [25], but used simply to assess
the impact of changing certain parameters, i.e., it did not
explore the possibility or competition between ISPs nor how
the presence of coordinated revenue maximization by ISPs
would influence the outcome.
There is also a vast literature on two-sided markets, and
the reader is referred to [29], [30] for recent surveys. The most
relevant works deal with competing platforms [6], [31], e.g.,
IPv4 and IPv6, but the absence of pricing for one side of the
market (the ICPs) in our context makes for a very different
(and simpler) focus.
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper’s motivation is to develop a better understanding
of the reasons behind IPv6 ongoing struggle in convincing
Internet stakeholders to adopt it, and if possible suggest ways
to mitigate it. The paper develops models that explicitly
incorporate the dependencies that exist between the decisions
of Internet stake-holders, and explores how these dependencies
affect IPv6 adoption decisions under different scenarios. A first
set of scenarios involved ISPs that respond to IPv4 address
scarcity differently, namely, by using different connectivity
options. The ISPs then compete on the basis of their dif-
ferences in those connectivity options. The scenarios helped
demonstrate why, in the presence of such competition, devising
effective IPv6 adoption strategies may be difficult.
The paper then explored an alternative scenario that pre-
serves the ability to offer different connectivity options, but
does so assuming that connectivity choices are not anymore a
matter of competition between ISPs, e.g., there is a consensus
to offer similar options. While this is by itself not a sufficient
condition to ensure a rapid or even certain migration to an IPv6
Internet, it affords a more predictable look at how different
parameters can affect the outcome. In particular, it helped
identify the return on IPv6 adoption, ac6 , as a major factor
affecting IPv6 adoption by ICPs and users alike, i.e., larger
values of this ratio systematically help foster a more rapid and
complete migration to IPv6. The model also helped identify the
role that both IPv4 address acquisition costs, C, and translation
costs, D6, play. In particular, it showed that if IPv4 address
costs remain low, low translation costs can be detrimental and
delay an eventual migration to an IPv6 Internet. The latter is
to some extent a result of the model’s assumption of a myopic
decisions process by ISPs and ICPs, but while this can to some
extent be alleviated by allowing more strategic decisions, the
general behavior remains.
The models on which this paper’s investigation is based
have numerous obvious limitations, and clearly fail to capture
many of the factors that play a role in IPv6 adoption decisions.
However, they capture the interplay and roles of the different
Internet stake-holders and their decisions. As such the results
offer some insight into the potential causes behind the difficulty
of migrating to an IPv6 Internet, and point to possible remedies
to hasten it, e.g., by ensuring that ISPs offer users and ICPs
consistent connectivity choices and by focusing on increasing
the ICPs’ return on IPv6 adoption ac6 .
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